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Derivation of a Fluctuation Theorem from the probabilistic definition of entropy
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Universita¨tsstrasse 10, D-86135 Augsburg, Germany
It will be shown, how the Boltzmannian ideas on statistical physics can be naturally applied to
nonequilibrium thermodynamics. A similar approach for treating nonequilibrium phenomena has
been successfully used by Einstein and Smoluchowski treating fluctuations. It will be argued, that
due to the reversibility of the microscopic equations, all processes – also macroscopic ones – must
at least in principle be reversible. Also, a clear conceptual distinction between equilibrium and
nonequilibrium states is not possible in the Boltzmannian framework, which is just the reason why
these concepts should apply to nonequilibrium. In the present manuscript we derive a Fluctuation
Theorem from the equation S = kB lnP , where P is the probability of a state. The recently
discovered Fluctuation Theorems are some of the few exact results valid far from equilibrium. Two
assumptions are needed for the derivation: First, the process shall happen on certain time-scales that
are large compared with the time, during which the system memorizes its initial conditions. Second,
the entropy production rate averaged over all realizations of the process shall be constant during
the process. We will finally point out, why a solution to the problem of macroscopic irreversibility
invoking causality – as it was recently suggested in connection with the Fluctuation Theorem –
cannot live up to its task.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent times have shown considerable advance in the field of nonequilibrium thermodynamics, also called thermo-
dynamics of irreversible processes. This important progress – in a field that is in parts still not well understood – is
closely connected with two related theorems: the Fluctuation Theorem (Evans and Searles, 1993 and 2002) and the
Jarzynski Relation (Jarzynski, 1997). Crooks (1999) has shown, that both are closely related, the former being more
general than the latter. Let me quote Ruelle (1999) on the importance of the field:
“A quantitative approach to situations far from equilibrium has been developed in recent years, . . . with
such results as the Gallavotti-Cohen fluctuation theorem. This new approach, based on smooth ergodic
theory, does not solve all problems. In particular, quantum nonequilibrium is not covered. Nevertheless
it appears that, at long last, nonequilibrium statistical mechanics is acquiring the sort of mathematically
precise quantitative tools that equilibrium statistical mechanics has possessed and exploited so successfully
for more than a century” (p. 540).
This relatively early (compared with the development in this field) quote refers solely to the so called Steady State
Fluctuation Theorem (Gallavotti and Cohen, 1995a and 1995b), by now there is a whole family of closely related
Fluctuation Theorems applicable to different physical setups. Fluctuation Theorems determine exactly the relative
probability between processes with opposite average entropy production rate: σt and −σt. Mainly there are two types:
the Transient Fluctuation Theorem is applicable to systems driven away from an initial equilibrium state and the
Steady State Fluctuation Theorem is applicable to systems in a non-equilibrium staedy state. In this manuscript we
derive a theorem similar to the Fluctuation Theorems from within the framework of conventional statistical physics
as developed by Boltzmann, Planck, Einstein, Smoluchowski and others. The conceptual basis of the argument will
be, that the interpretation of entropy as probability in principle does not allow a distinction between reversible and
irreversible processes as well as equilibrium and nonequilibrium states. Thus, the mentioned theorem will be derived
from S = kB lnP , where P is the probability of a state. It will be shown, how time-averaging allows for the definition
of the probability of processes as it allowed for the definition of the probability of states.
From the philosophical perspective, the context and justification of the present manuscript should be seen in
accordance with the view of nonequilibrium thermodynamics as suggested by Jos Uffink (2001):
“However, since the Second World War, a lot of work has been done in obtaining extensions of thermo-
dynamics which could be applied to systems out of equilibrium. . . . It is characteristic of this type of
work that it is focussed on applications and gives comparatively little attention to the foundations and
logical formulation of the theory. . . . The question how the entropy of a non-equilibrium state is to be
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defined, and the proof that it exists and is unique for all non-equilibrium states, still seem to be largely
unexplored” (p. 389).
As said, I will rely on the fact, that the Boltzmannian approach does not depend crucially on a distinction between
nonequilibrium and equilibrium states, and thus should work equally well for both cases. Within the Boltzmannian
framework, there exists a well-defined nonequilibrium entropy, given by the development of the examined system over
time.
This manuscript closely follows the Boltzmannian view on thermodynamics as it has been so fruitfully used by
Einstein and Smoluchowski in their treatment of fluctuations, which are of course nonequilibrium phenomena. Due to
the conceptual difficulties of the Gibbs approach when treating nonequilibrium, a consequent treatment of fluctuations
may in the end be possible only within the Boltzmannian framework. By staying with Boltzmann our conceptual
framework does not depend on the ergodicity of a system. However, ergodicity is still a crucial ingredient for explaining
the success of the Gibbs approach. In fact, it is still one of the big questions in the foundations of statistical physics,
how all the different concepts of entropy fit together. But work is done also on this front (e.g. Frigg, 2004). In a
first part of this manuscript we will discuss the conceptual foundations both with reference to some historical (but
nevertheless relevant) physics-literature and with reference to more recent discussions in the philosophy-of-physics-
literature. In the second part we will outline a mathematical framework, that is consistent with the Boltzmann
approach and valid also for nonequilibrium states and processes in general. The concepts used owe much to Einstein’s
early work in statistical physics, e.g. on the theory of critical opalescence (Einstein, 1910) and on quantum mechanics
(Einstein, 1905).
II. PROCESSES IN CONVENTIONAL STATISTICAL PHYSICS
A. Preliminary note: why Boltzmann should not be underestimated
It shall shortly be recalled, how the Boltzmannian approach to thermodynamics naturally applies to nonequilibrium.
As said, Einstein’s and Smoluchowski’s theory of fluctuations is a nonequilibrium theory. This extension of the
Boltzmann picture is so natural that Einstein repeatedly wondered, why Boltzmann did not draw this conclusion
himself. The most famous example of course is Brownian Motion. A little less known is the explanation of critical
opalescence given by Smoluchowski (1908) and Einstein (1910). They explain this phenomenon, which is for example
responsible for the blue of the sky, with density-fluctuations in the air. Using Boltzmann’s statistical entropy for
single systems, these density fluctuations of the air correspond to entropy fluctuations. Einstein (1910) presents a
very consistent picture of how Boltzmann’s ideas apply to nonequilibrium phenomena.
Let us further examine the case of Brownian Motion. The movement of a Brownian particle is caused by local
fluctuations in the velocity distribution around the particle. These fluctuations are only possible within the statistical
view of nature. Even more, as will be argued later, they are only possible within the Boltzmannian statistical approach.
The core of the reasoning for treating Brownian Motion is well grasped by a quote from Smoluchowski (1906) (quoted
by Kac, 1986):
“Na¨geli thought that he invalidated this theory [that Brownian motion is caused by molecular collisions]
by showing that the velocity acquired by a particle of size 0.003 mm in a collision with another particle
would only be 2 · 10−6 mm/s which would be unobservable under a microscope, and claiming further that
the shocks coming from all directions would, on the average, cancel. This is the same error in reasoning
as that leading to the conclusion that a player in a game of chance (e.g. tossing of a die) would never lose
or gain more than a single stake. We know however that good and bad luck do not cancel completely and
the longer the game lasts the greater is the average gain or loss” (p. 18).
In a qualitative explanation for Brownian motion, Smoluchowski assumes, that there is an equal chance for a positive
and a negative result. The probability, that within n throws of a dice there are m positive and n−m negative results,
is of course
n!
2nm!(n−m)!
. (1)
Then the average deviation (in positive or negative direction) from the value zero, is:
ν = 2
n∑
m=n2
(
n
m
)
2m− n
2n
=
n
2n
(
n
n
2
)
, (2)
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which gives for large n
ν =
√
2n
π
. (3)
Although this simplified version of Brownian motion is of course not numerically exact, it already shows the correct
relation between mean square displacement and time of observation as in the diffusion equation 〈x2〉 ∝ t.
The classical thermodynamical view cannot deal with this result, because in it the gas around the Brownian particle
should at some point in time have reached equilibrium, where macroscopic parameters shouldn’t change (including
the velocity of a macroscopically detectable Brownian particle). We also see here, that a consequent thermodynamical
viewpoint implying a deterministic Second Law is already incompatible with the molecular structure of matter, in
this case the ideal gas.
Let us now address the curious conceptual defects in the Gibbs approach, when dealing with nonequilibrium.
Lebowitz (1999) writes:
“However, unlike [the Boltzmann entropy] SB, [the Gibbs entropy] SG does not change in time even for
time-dependent ensembles describing (isolated) systems not in equilibrium. Hence the relevant entropy
for understanding the time evolution of macroscopic systems is SB and not SG” (p. S349).
The problem consists in the fact, that in the Gibbs approach ensembles are used to describe single systems. These
ensembles should result from the time-evolution of the system itself (assuming ergodicity). Thus, in the Gibbs
approach, essentially time averages are calculated (averaged over infinite times). Thus, there is no room in the Gibbs
picture for time evolution. For this very reason, one must resort to Boltzmannian arguments for the treatment of
nonequilibrium. Compare also Lavis (2005) for the applicability of the Gibbs approach:
“A consistent approach, consonant with our treatment of the Boltzmann approach, is to suppose that the
only meaningful probability density function to be used from the Gibbs approach is the time-independent
solution of Liouville’s equation determined by the dynamics and the physical constraints on the system.
A change of physical constraints will lead to an instant discontinuous change in the probability density
function and the Gibbs entropy. An uncommon state (like, for example, the case of all the particles being
in one end of the box) will have low probability when calculated using [the equilibrium probability density
function] ρG(x) and low Boltzmann entropy, but the same Gibbs entropy as any other configuration” (p.
263).
The point of view suggested by Lebowitz and Lavis seems to me the only conceptually sound conclusion drawn from
the fact, that in the Gibbsian approach we calculate the entropy of a single system by integrating over an ensemble
of systems, including some, that are highly nonequilibrium states from the Boltzmannian point of view.
B. Reversible and irreversible processes
Generally, processes are divided into reversible and irreversible processes. This distinction has its origin in the 19th
century within traditional thermodynamics, i.e. in the time before Boltzmann and Planck introduced the probabilistic
interpretation of entropy
S = kB lnP, (4)
where kB is Boltzmann’s constant and P is the probability of a state. The probability P describes the number of
microscopic states compatible with the given macroscopic boundary conditions (ensemble-version of probability) or
the fraction of time that the system is in the desired macroscopic state (time-version of probability). In the second half
of the 19th century Boltzmann suggested a derivation of thermodynamics from mechanistic concepts. The criticism
of Poincare´, Loschmidt, Zermelo and others mostly relied on the fact that in microscopic physics all processes are
reversible while thermodynamics knows irreversible processes. This criticism has contributed in considerable extent
to the development of Boltzmann’s probabilistic interpretation of entropy, which implies that in principle also all
macroscopic processes are reversible (compare also Einstein, 1910, and Smoluchowski, 1915). Only, the process
happening in one direction of time is much more probable than its occurrence in the opposite time-direction. In fact,
the difference for the probabilities is so large, that most macroscopic processes will be observed only in one direction
of time leading to the observed ‘irreversibility’ in the macroscopic world. However, in principle the probabilistic
interpretation of entropy is not compatible with a conceptual distinction between reversible and irreversible processes.
All processes should be treatable in the same way. Statements as such are essential in the statistical interpretation of
thermodynamics. Compare for example Smoluchowski (1916):
C The probability of states 4
“A process appears irreversible (reversible), when the initial state has a recurrence time which is long
(short) compared to the time of observation” (my italics, p. 77).
Uffink (2001) argues, “that the second law has nothing to do with the arrow of time” (p. 305). Since Uffink’s
discussion concerns thermodynamics, this refers to the thermodynamical, i.e. macroscopic, second law. The main
merit of his standpoint is, “that the second law would no longer represent an obstacle to the reconciliation of different
theories of physics” (p. 94), i.e. between thermodynamics and mechanics. Uffink does not seem to favor any of
the Boltzmannian approaches to thermodynamics (“But apparently there is another option” (p. 388).). Nevertheless,
Uffink’s task of examining thermodynamics with respect to the distinction between reversible and irreversible processes
is of considerable importance also from the Boltzmannian point of view. If a conceptual distinction between reversible
and irreversible processes would be possible on a macroscopic scale, that would clearly contrast the Boltzmannian
view of the Second Law as stated by Smoluchowski above.
The Boltzmannian explanation for irreversibility is consensus among most physicists and many philosophers of
science. Compare for example Ruelle (1993):
“The explanation of irreversibility, that we have come up with following Boltzmann, is at the same time
simple and quite subtle. It is a probabilistic explanation. It does not imply an irreversibility of the
fundamental laws of physics, but there is something special about the initial state of the system, that
we are observing: the initial state is extremely improbable. . . . I have described the interpretation of
irreversibility, that is generally accepted by physicists these days” (my translation, p. 119).
Or Lebowitz (1993):
“Boltzmann’s thoughts have withstood the test of time” (p. 32).
The few voices dissenting with the Boltzmannian viewpoint as for example that presented in Prigogine (1999)
have thus far not had much impact. Also, the fact that there actually exists a field in physics called the theory of
irreversible processes is probably not so much owed to a distrust in the Boltzmannian argument, but stems more from
a desire to mathematically reproduce nature at different levels of complexity. The complete reduction of irreversible
macroscopic phenomena to the microscopic level, where full reversibility should again show up, is in many cases
practically impossible and even undesirable.
C. The probability of states
For itself Eq. (4) does not make sense without a concept how to determine the probability of a macroscopic state. In
general, there have been two different approaches to define the probability of a state. One is the ensemble approach,
where the probability is determined by the number of systems that are in the desired states divided by the number
of systems that make up the whole ensemble. In the following, we will call this type of probability in short ensemble-
probability. This definition is not yet sufficient as such, but strongly depends how one chooses the members of the
ensemble. To my knowledge, there are no apparent epistemological reasons, how to choose these members except by
relying on the second type of probability.
This type of probability is given by the observation of a single system over the course of a long time-span τ . The
probability P (Z) of a certain state Z is then given by the amount of time ∆τ , that the system is in state Z during
τ :
P (Z) =
∆τ
τ
. (5)
In the following we will shortly call this probability time-probability. Before addressing the difficulties connected
with Eq. (5), I want to emphasize again that time-probabilities are epistemologically better justified than ensemble-
probabilities. Boltzmann, Smoluchowski and Einstein shared this believe at least for a good part of their life, as
they all heavily rely on this concept in their work. As already mentioned, to me the obvious reason to prefer time-
probabilities is that it is not clear how to choose the members of an ensemble of systems. It would not make sense to
include microscopic states in the ensemble that cannot be reached by the single system considered in an experiment.
Thus the ensemble is best chosen by observing which states a single system can take on over the course of time. In
other words, this means that ensemble-probabilities should be derived from time-probabilities.
Another interesting argument in favor of time-probabilities can be found in one of Einstein’s most important papers
on statistical physics (Einstein, 1910). There, he states that time-probabilities are the most natural approach since
they do not have to rely on a microscopic interpretation for the probability of a state. Einstein also emphasizes the
connection between time-probabilities and the reversibility of processes. Of course, only if a system will always return
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arbitrarily close to a state already taken, then the definition (5) will make sense, because there is a well-defined limit
as τ →∞. The probability of an area in phase space, which is transversed only a finite number of times, is zero in the
limit τ → ∞. (Note, that actually the trajectories do not have to be reversible. It suffices to require that a system
will always return arbitrarily close to every state once taken on. For example a system consisting of a single particle
moving in a fixed direction on a circle is not time-reversible, since a reversal of the trajectory is never observed by
definition. However, the time-probabilities of all possible states can well be defined.)
The conceptual problems in the definition of (5) are also noted in Einstein (1910). The main difficulty is, that the
more exactly we define the macroscopic state Z, the less probable it is. For example if Z is defined through a certain
exact value of the macroscopic parameter λn = λ
0
n, then if we compare with the cases when λn is not λ
0
n, the resulting
probability P (Z) will be zero according to (5).
To resolve this difficulty, we can divide the observation time τ into intervals of equal length. The probability of
a certain state determined by the value λ0n is then given by the number of intervals, during which λn assumes the
value λ0n divided by the total number of intervals within τ . (This should be understood just as a general idea, how
time-probability could be defined. There may be some technical difficulties like for example normalization, which
can however be resolved.) Note, that from the perspective of time-probability this approach is more general than
coarse-graining of phase space into cells, as again we do not have to rely on a microscopic theory.
D. Equilibrium and nonequilibrium states
Just as there is no difference in principle between irreversible processes and reversible processes, there are no
conceptual grounds to distinguish between equilibrium and nonequilibrium states. This has been noted for example
by Einstein (1917):
“It was clear, that strictly speaking thermodynamic equilibrium does not exist, but rather that every
system left to itself will fluctuate irregularly around the state of ideal thermodynamic equilibrium” (my
translation, p. 107).
In the framework of statistical physics a macroscopic state is determined by the macroscopic boundary conditions.
Once these boundary conditions are fixed, the system should freely make use of its microscopic degrees of freedom
(this property called ‘mixing’ is sufficient for the identity of ensemble-probability and time-probability). For example,
take the case when a gas is allowed to expand ‘irreversibly’ into empty space. According to conventional dictation
the gas is in a nonequilibrium state at first and then relaxes into equilibrium. However, according to the Poincare´
Recurrence Theorem if we wait long enough, the gas will return arbitrarily close to the supposed nonequilibrium state.
In principle the relaxation process will never finish. It is generally argued, that the equilibrium state is just the by far
most probable state – this is the late Boltzmannian point of view consistent with Boltzmann’s coarse-grained entropy
(Boltzmann, 1877). However, this definition of equilibrium depends crucially on which macroscopic parameters one
chooses to define equilibrium (we will work this out in more detail below). And then if one looks close enough, one will
always detect that the system is subject to more or less tiny fluctuations and thus not in equilibrium. In summary,
the system will never be in equilibrium but always in a nonequilibrium state.
A way out of this dilemma could be the approach of including fluctuations up to a certain amount into the
equilibrium state. Van Lith (1999) suggests the following definition:
“let us consider a class Ω of macroscopically relevant quantities and define the system to be in equilibrium
from t = τ onwards iff its distribution ρt obeys
∀F ∈ Ω, ∀t ≥ τ, ∃c : |〈F 〉ρt − c| ≤ ǫF . (6)
That is, a system is in equilibrium when the ensemble averages of phase functions in some class Ω are
time-independent, or may fluctuate in time at most within some small, fixed intervals ǫF” (p. S114).
As van Lith notes, there rests the problem of determining the ǫF . In my view, this point is crucial. Considering the
great variety of different systems to which Eq. (6) should apply, there may be great difficulties in coming up with a
conceptually well founded rule for determining the size of the ǫF .
In a somewhat similar problem runs the late Boltzmann (1877) with the coarse-grained version of his entropy. The
six-dimensional phase-space for the single molecule is coarse-grained. The state of the single molecule is determined
by the cell of phase-space in which the molecule can be found. The macroscopic state is determined by the number
of molecules in each cell. For simplicity of the argument, let us just consider the physical space and assume that the
velocity distribution corresponds to the equilibrium distribution. Given a fixed number of particles N in a certain
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volume V , the value of the entropy depends crucially on the size of the cells in space. Let the gas expand from a small
part of the volume to the whole volume V (again, the velocity distribution shall not change at all). Now strangely,
we will have no change in entropy at all if the cells are chosen small enough such that basically always there is only
just one particle in every cell. There may be small fluctuations with finite-size cells – as sometimes there may be
two particles in one cell – but as the cell size becomes infinitely small we will never have a change in entropy at all.
This is grotesquely at odds with the intuitive notion of approach to equilibrium. In the other extreme case, if we let
the cell size take the whole volume V , then we wouldn’t have any change in entropy either. Only for intermediate
cell-sizes in physical space, the entropy really changes. We see, how crucial the Boltzmannian definition of equilibrium
depends on the cell size. If for example we let the cell size be of size V , the system will trivially always be in its
most probable state, per definition the equilibrium state. For very small cell size, the system will also always be in
equilibrium. Thus, as in the van Lith approach the difficulty consists in determining the size of the ǫF , the problem
for the Boltzmann equilibrium consists in finding a conceptual foundation for the size of the cells. From the classical
point of view, this question has no satisfying answer at all.
From the quantum-mechanical point of view, the standard argument goes, that the cell size in phase space is
determined by the quantum of action. This may be a somewhat satisfying answer, but in any case it is at most
only half an answer. The size of the quantum of action does not determine, which ‘part’ of h shall be attributed to
the physical space and which one to the velocity-space. In general, the argument presented above still holds, since
we can still choose the cell size in physical space as small as possible by adjusting at the same time the cell size in
velocity-space. Since the units of space and impulse are not comparable with each other, there is no way to somehow
equally distribute h. Zeh (1992) disagrees with the whole quantum-mechanical argument for determining the cell size:
“the justification of this procedure [i.e. the coarse-graining] by the uncertainty relations, and accordingly
the choice of the size of these phase space cells as h3N (or N !h3N ) may be tempting, but would clearly be
inconsistent with classical mechanics. The consistent quantum mechanical treatment leads again to the
conservation of ensemble entropy (now for ensembles of wave functions). ‘Quantum cells’ of size h3N can
be justified only as convenient units for measuring the phase space volume in order to obtain the same
normalization of entropy as in the classical limit of quantum statistical mechanics, where ensemble entropy
vanishes for pure states (which correspond to one cell . . . )” (p. 50).
Let us finally quote Lavis (2005) on the subject of getting a proper definition of equilibrium:
“At one end there is a well-used concept of equilibrium in thermodynamics and at the other dynamic
equilibrium does not exist in measure-preserving reversible dynamic systems” (p. 245).
Lavis suggests to replace the binary concept of equilibrium by a gradual quantity he calls commonness. This seems
a natural suggestion, because as we have just argued there will always be a certain arbitrariness in the notion if a
system is in equilibrium or not. On the borderline it is hard to imagine any sound reasons, why a certain microscopic
state should be counted as an equilibrium state and another one not. Thus, a concept of commonness is certainly
much better founded than the binary property of equilibrium. Lavis introduces commonness in the following way:
“All references to a system being, or not being, in equilibrium should be replaced by references to the com-
monness of the state of the system, with this property being given by some suitably-scaled monotonically
increasing function of the Boltzmann entropy” (p. 257).
However in my view not much is gained by this proposal. We have introduced a new quantity, that has no real
empirical meaning (except of course in the reduction to binary equilibrium), since physicists have thus far been able
to interpret nature without it. And since the definition involves a function of entropy, it seems plausible, that we
could just work with entropy itself without the need of defining any new entity. On the other hand, if the new concept
helps to bridge the gap between the concept of equilibrium according to Gibbs and that according to Boltzmann, this
would in my view be reason enough to introduce the new quantity.
In the continuation of this manuscript I will follow a different line. Keeping in mind the arbitrariness in the definition
of equilibrium, maybe the concept itself is not needed at all. I will try to derive a recently discovered theorem from
the probabilistic definition of entropy S = kB lnP , where P is the probability of a state. Here, it is not of importance
if P describes the probability for an equilibrium or a nonequilibrium state.
E. Driven processes and fluctuations
Driven processes, i.e. processes that are determined by a changing external parameter, play an important role in
nonequilibrium thermodynamics. Consequently an important question is how driven processes fit into the framework
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of conventional statistical mechanics. The basic idea here is that every driven process can also be represented as a
fluctuation in a system with enough degrees of freedom. The parameters that are changed in a determined way during
the driven process must be considered as degrees of freedom for the corresponding fluctuating system.
Consider for example a gas that is compressed and expanded by a piston. This driven process can be related to a
fluctuating process by allowing the volume of the gas fluctuate within the range that the piston covers. Also, since
in the driven process the piston performs work on the system while the volume of the gas expands or compresses,
the total energy of the gas must be allowed to fluctuate. Of course normally the system will not fluctuate in the way
that the piston moves during a determined driven process. However, there should be certain periods in time, where
the fluctuation of the system follows the same trajectory in phase space as if the system is subjected to the driven
process. These fluctuations can then be evaluated in the framework of conventional statistical physics and the results
should be the same as for a theory of driven processes.
In general, λ1 . . .λr shall be all observable macroscopic variables. We fix a certain amount of these parameters:
without loss of generality λ1 . . .λf . The probability of a state, given by certain values of λf+1 . . .λr will then be
determined by the fraction of time during which the systems takes on these values. Now, how can we determine the
probability of a state during a driven process? Without loss of generality λf shall be the external parameter that
changes in the process. The probability and thus the entropy of states during a driven process can be determined by
looking at a system, where λf is one of the parameters not fixed.
Note the basic assumption that allows for this interpretation of driven processes: When given a certain amount of
freedom, the system will completely cover the whole corresponding phase space in the course of time. The macroscopic
degrees of freedom determine the microscopic phase space of the system, in which the system is allowed to move.
Notably, there is a connection between which driven processes and which fluctuations are possible. For example, if we
allow the system to be in two unconnected areas of phase space, of course it will not fluctuate freely within the whole
area, but will only stay in that part where it was at the beginning. For example, these areas could represent two
non-overlapping intervals of the parameter λn, which shall change continuously with the microscopic development of
the system. It is in accordance with our view, that just as the system will not fluctuate from one area to the other,
as well one cannot think of a driven process that connects the two separate areas in phase space.
F. Equilibrium and nonequilibrium processes
In classical thermodynamics equilibrium processes are defined to be infinitely slow. From the statistical perspective
this definition makes no sense, since as discussed above the system will never relax into an equilibrium state, but
will always fluctuate more or less far around the most probable state. According to classical thermodynamics, first
the boundary conditions are changed and then with constant boundary conditions the system is allowed to ‘relax’.
However, taking seriously the statistical foundation of thermodynamics the system will not relax forever. For example,
it will return at later moments arbitrarily close to the state from which it is allowed to relax. Already the use of
the expression ‘relax into’ seems to imply an irreversible change which in fact is not happening. For this reason an
infinitely slow process is not in any way different from a finite time process, since there is no defined limit for the
state of a system as t → ∞. In principle, there is no difference between equilibrium processes and nonequilibrium
processes exactly because the expression ‘relax into an equilibrium state’ is not meaningful in the statistical context.
In my opinion, the described situation, that there is only one kind of processes and a clear distinction between
equilibrium and nonequilibrium processes is not possible as is a sound distinction between reversible and irreversible
processes, may well be criticized. For this very reason the discussion about the irreversibility problem is still going
on. But one should also keep in mind, that rejecting the situation described in this first part of the manuscript, also
means rejecting the Boltzmannian explanation of irreversibility and thus the Boltzmannian interpretation of entropy
as probability.
III. THE PROBABILITY OF PROCESSES
A. The time-probability of processes
Previously, we have discussed the probability of states resulting from the fraction of time, during which the system
is in the considered state compared with the full observation time. In a similar manner we can now define the
probability of processes consisting of a sequence of states. We can for example determine the relative probability of
two processes A→ B and C → D by counting how often process A→ B is observed during a certain time compared
with process C → D. It is useful but not necessary to assume that both processes should have the same duration
t. Similar problems are encountered as in the definition of the probability of states. As a process is defined more
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and more exactly through macroscopic parameters the process will eventually have probability zero. Thus, processes
should be determined only up to a given uncertainty. We have for the ratio of probabilities P
P (A→ B, t)
P (C → D, t)
=
NA→B,t
NC→D,t
, (7)
where N denotes the number of times the process occurs during the whole observation time.
B. Derivation of a Fluctuation Theorem
In the first part of this manuscript it was argued that once the interpretation of entropy as probability is accepted
then in principle the distinction between reversible and irreversible processes cannot be made, as well as between
equilibrium and nonequilibrium states. This means that the results of so-called nonequilibrium thermodynamics
should be attained from the same fundamental concept as the results of equilibrium thermodynamics. Consequently,
in the following we will show how a Fluctuation Theorem can be derived from the most basic formula of statistical
physics (4). Only two additional assumptions have to be made. The first comparing the time during which the system
loses memory of initial conditions with the time-scales of the considered processes. The second assumption states that
the entropy production rate should be constant during an averaged fluctuation.
We can calculate the probability for a fluctuation with help of the following formula:
P (A→ B, t) = P (A→ Z1,∆t)P (Z1 → Z2,∆t) . . . P (ZN → B,∆t) = P (Z1)
∆t
t P (Z2)
∆t
t . . . P (B)
∆t
t (8)
For the second equality the first assumption introduced above is necessary. The time span ∆t must be large compared
with the time tml during which the system looses the information about its initial conditions. This is necessary because
otherwise, the system could not be in an arbitrary macroscopic state within ∆t. Consider for example the probability
P (Z1 → Z2,∆t) = P (Z2)
∆t
t . If within ∆t the system could not in principle reach an arbitrary macroscopic state, i.e.
if the memory of the initial state Z1 would not be lost, then it would not be consistent to take the probability of the
state P (Z2) as probability for the process Z1 → Z2.
A sense for the order of magnitude of tml can be derived from the typical ‘relaxation times’ of a system, which it
takes to attain ‘equilibrium’ starting from a ‘nonequilibrium state’. Consider the example of a gas expanding into
empty space. Usually this expansion is very fast and much faster than a controlled expansion with the use of a
moving piston. Thus, just as the assumption seems justified in this particular case, it may be a plausible condition,
that however has to be verified in each case. Later on we will discuss qualitatively the limitations that the described
condition imposes on the applicability of the Fluctuation Theorem derived here.
Note, that only with ∆t in the exponent of the probabilities, a consistent definition of the probability of a process
is possible. In particular a limiting value can be defined as ∆t becomes very small (the probabilitites P for the states
must be fixed during this limiting process). Also, if we consider a static process, where the system is always in the
same state A, then the probabilty for the process P (A→ A, t) is only independent of ∆t if it is in the exponent. We
now employ the basic formula of statistical physics S = kB lnP . This yields
P (A→ B, t) = e
S(Z1)+S(Z2)+S(Z3)+...+S(ZN )+S(B)
kB
∆t
t . (9)
We see that this definition for the probability of a process leads to the following result, when we consider a process
A→ B and its time-reversed counter-part B → A:
P (A→ B, t) = e
S(Z1)+S(Z2)+...+S(ZN )+S(B)
kB
∆t
t ≈ e
S(ZN )+S(ZN−1)+...+S(Z1)+S(A)
kB
∆t
t = P (B → A, t). (10)
In the limit ∆t→ 0 this result is exact. The fact that a process and its time-reversed counter-part both have the same
probability is a necessary result for the probabilistic interpretation of entropy. This can be seen when we consider a
process that is described by one macroscopic parameter λn (Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest, 1911, and Smoluchowski, 1916).
The most probable value of λn shall be denoted as λ
0
n. It is generally assumed in statistical physics that the most
probable value is by far more probable than different values of λn. Thus the system will fluctuate around λ
0
n. Now,
when we observe the system over a long enough time τ →∞ of course for every process, where the system fluctuates
away from the equilibrium λ0n by a certain value ∆λn, there must be a process, where the time-reversed fluctuation
takes place. The system will always return to equilibrium. Additionally, it has to be assumed that the underlying
microscopic equations are symmetrical in time, so that fluctuations will be similar both towards and away from
equilibrium. (E.g. without the reversibility of microscopic equations one could imagine, that the required duration
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for a fluctuation ∆λn towards the equilibrium value could in average be different than the duration for a fluctuation
∆λn away from the equilibrium value.)
As is examined by the Fluctuation Theorems (Evans and Searles, 2002), we can now compare two processes (e.g.
two fluctuations) both with a duration t. Similar to the assumptions for the Transient Fluctuation Theorem, where
the initial state is always the equilibrium state, we assume that here the initial macroscopic state for both processes
is the same A. In one process the entropy shall increase by S0, in the other the entropy shall decrease by S0. We
compare these fluctuations A→ B and A→ C:
P (A→ B, t)
P (A→ C, t)
=
e
[S(Z1)+S(Z2)+...+S(ZN )+S(B)]
kB
∆t
t
e
[S(Y1)+S(Y2)+...+S(YN )+S(C)]
kB
∆t
t
(11)
Now in general we arrive from (11) at a form similar to that of the Fluctuation Theorem only if we assume, that we
have
S(t+∆t)− S(t) = ∆S, (12)
where ∆S does not depend on t but only on ∆t, i.e. the entropy production rate shall be constant during the whole
process (we will later examine, what this means and how this condition can be generalized). Under this condition,
we have
S(Z1) + S(Z2) + S(Z3) + . . .+ S(ZN) + S(B) =
N + 1
2
(S(B) + S(Z1)) ≈
t
∆t
S(B) + S(A)
2
. (13)
Eqs. (11) and (13) lead to a Fluctuation Theorem, that corresponds in the form to the family of Fluctuation Theorems
(Evans and Searles, 2002):
P (σt =
S0
t )
P (σt = −
S0
t )
=
P (A→ B, t)
P (A→ C, t)
=
e
S(B)+S(A)
2kB
e
S(C)+S(A)
2kB
= e
S0
kB . (14)
Here, σt denotes the average entropy production rate of the process. For the last equality we employed S(B) =
S(A) + S0 and S(C) = S(A)− S0.
C. Generalization
Thus far, we have only derived a Fluctuation Theorem for processes, which exhibit a constant entropy production
rate. In general, real processes do not have this property. Consequently we will now show, how the assumption
of constant entropy production rate can be generalized. We will see, that the Fluctuation Theorem derived in this
manuscript also holds for processes where the entropy production rate is constant only in average over all realizations
of the process. This way we can calculate the probabilities for different processes where just the averaged entropy
production rate over the whole time t is given. This corresponds to the formulation of the Transient Fluctuation
Theorem.
We generalize Eq. (8) in the following way
P (A→ B, t) = P (A→ Z1,∆t1)P (Z1 → Z2,∆t2) . . . P (ZN → B,∆tN+1) = P (Z1)
∆t1
t P (Z2)
∆t2
t . . . P (B)
∆tN+1
t , (15)
where in general the different ∆t are not equal. The average process is now defined by the geometric mean of all s
realizations of the process, where in time t the system undergoes the sequence of states A, Z1, . . . , ZN , B:
P (A→ B, t) = [P ′(A→ B, t)P ′′(A→ B, t)P ′′′(A→ B, t) . . .]1/s =
= [P (Z1)
∆t′1
t P (Z2)
∆t′2
t . . . P (B)
∆t′
N+1
t P (Z1)
∆t′′1
t P (Z2)
∆t′′2
t . . . P (B)
∆t′′
N+1
t P (Z1)
∆t′′′1
t P (Z2)
∆t′′′2
t . . . P (B)
∆t′′′
N+1
t . . .]1/s =
= P (Z1)
1
s
∑
1,...,s
∆t1
t P (Z2)
1
s
∑
1,...,s
∆t2
t . . . P (B)
1
s
∑
1,...,s
∆tN+1
t (16)
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We see that the Fluctuation Theorem (14) holds under the following condition: If without loss of generality the states
A, Z1, . . . , ZN , B are chosen such that their entropies differ by a constant value ∆S, it follows directly
1
s
∑
1,...,s
∆t1 =
1
s
∑
1,...,s
∆t2 = . . . =
1
s
∑
1,...,s
∆tN+1 = ∆t. (17)
This statement is the final formulation of the second assumption. In other words, the entropy production for a process
must be constant in average over all realizations of the process.
D. Applicability of the Fluctuation Theorem (14)
In the following we want to briefly discuss the two assumptions made in the course of the derivation of the Fluctuation
Theorem (14).
As noted before, Eq. (8) is valid, if we assume that the rate at which the system looses information about its initial
conditions is much greater than the rate of the considered processes (first assumption). This condition imposes a
limitation on the validity of the Fluctuation Theorem (14). Accordingly, processes or fluctuations happening too fast
should not be described by the Fluctuation Theorem (14). In comparison, the Fluctuation Theorems (Evans and
Searles, 2002) at first do not seem to set any restrictions on the rate of considered fluctuations, i.e. on the time in
which a given fluctuation may occur. Compare for example the Transient Fluctuation Theorem as given by Evans
and Searles (2002, p. 1532):
p(Σt = A)
p(Σt = −A)
= eAt ∀ t. (18)
Here, Σt is the entropy production rate and p(Σt = A) denotes the probability that the value of Σt lies within the
range A to A+ dA. As no restrictions are made for the size of A by Eq. (18), no restrictions are made on the rate of
the considered fluctuations. However, the microscopic equations do impose restrictions on the size of A. If the energy
of the considered system has an upper boundary, there exists also an upper boundary for the maximum velocity
of the particles which make up the system. This boundary on the velocity means that certain areas of the phase
space cannot be connected within an arbitrarily small time-span. Consequently, there results also a maximum on the
entropy production rate in the system, which is not determined by (18).
The second assumption states that the averaged entropy production rate is always constant if we consider a process
with the sequence of macroscopic states A, Z1, . . . ,ZN , B. Eq. (12) translates to
P (t+∆t)
P (t)
= const (19)
independent of t. As we average over all possible realizations of the considered process, of course there can be only one
average entropy production rate for every instant of the process. This does not determine if the entropy production
rate will change over the course of the process or not. However, condition (19) seems quite natural: It states that the
average time needed for a fluctuation from a state Zn to another state Zn+1 depends only on the ratio of the number
of microscopic states consistent with each macroscopic state.
Of course, both assumptions must be verified for each system examined. The fact, that this task is not at all easy
does not alter our main point concerning the role of the Fluctuation Theorem within the framework of statistical
physics.
IV. ADDENDUM: ON THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY REQUIRED BY REVERSIBILITY
We will in the following shortly develop a concept of causality that is consistent with the reversibility of microscopic
equations, because by Evans and Searles (1996) causality is claimed as a solution to the problem of macroscopic
irreversibility. We will show, why this proposal cannot live up to its task. The following section is motivated by a
statement in The physical basis of the direction of time of Zeh (1992):
“The laws of nature, thus refined to their purely dynamical sense, describe the time dependence of physical
states, z(t), in a general form – usually by means of differential equations. They are called deterministic
if they uniquely determine the state at time t from that at an earlier or later time (and possibly its time
derivative), that is, from an appropriate initial or final condition. This symmetric causal structure of
dynamical determinism is stronger than the traditional concept of causality” (p. 1).
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Obviously, Zeh argues for a symmetric, i.e. reversible, causal structure of the microscopic equations, that is of course
not compatible with the intuitive notion of irreversible causality. Thus, it is straight-forward to conclude that the
problem of macroscopic irreversibility cannot be solved by invoking an ‘irreversible’ concept of causality. In Physics
and Chance Sklar (1993) argues in a similar way:
“It is certainly quite conceivable that with sufficient insight we could construct an argument that starts
with the standard temporal asymmetry of temporarily isolated systems in a time parallel process of entropic
increase in one time direction and not the other, and end with a plausible generation of the conditions
in the natural world that ground our intuition of causation going from past to future or of records being
only of the past and not the future. Perhaps, we could even explain the one-way efficacy in time of the
process we call memory. It remains to be seen if this is so. This final stage of the Boltzmann thesis is
neither proven nor disproven at the moment” (p. 404).
The quote of Sklar is revealing in two aspects. First, he argues that the asymmetric notions of causality could very
well be derivable from reversible microscopic equations for a temporarily isolated system. Second, he argues that this
program should be worked out within the Boltzman approach.
The most important conclusion we can draw from both quotes, is that the irreversibility problem cannot be solved
starting from an intuitive concept of asymmetric causality which is not somehow expressed in the microscopic equa-
tions. Basically two options are left for the role causality could play in the irreversibility context. First, causality
could be important on the axiomatic level of physical theories. Then, the fundamental equations would have to be
changed in order to represent irreversible causality. Second, the microscopic equations are correct. Then ‘irreversible’
causality is only a derived concept, a name for a property of the physical equations. Because it is a derived concept
it cannot provide an alternative for the Boltzmannian solution to macroscopic irreversibility. It’s only a new name
for it. Since Evans and Searles (2002) do not claim to change the fundamental equations to express irreversibility (p.
1529, this was for example the approach taken by Prigogine, 1999), their ‘solution’ must be option two, i.e. it must
correspond to the Boltzmannian picture.
This said, we will in the following work out in more detail, what concept of causality is required by reversible micro-
scopic equations. In accordance with the quote from Zeh, given above, this reversible causality strongly contradicts
the notion of causality, as it is presented by Evans and Searles (2002):
“The future state of the system is computed solely from the probabilities of events in the past. This is
called the Axiom of Causality.
It is logically possible to compute the probability of occurrence of present states from the probabilities of
future events, but this seems totally unnatural. Will the electric light be on now, because at some time in
the (near) future, we will throw a switch which applies the necessary voltage [my italics]? A major problem
with this approach is that at any given instant, the future states are generally not known! In spite of these
philosophical and practical difficulties, we will explore the logical consequences of the (unphysical) Axiom
of Anticausality” (p. 1564).
We will first examine causality in Newtonian physics and find that the Newtonian Laws do not allow for a conceptual
distinction between cause and effect, in particular a temporal asymmetry cannot be established. The third Newtonian
axiom ‘actio=reactio’ states the equivalence of the acting and the reacting force. In particular this means that one
cannot distinguish in principle, which is the acting and which the reacting force, i.e. cause and effect cannot be
distinguished in principle. Consider two massive particles A and B acting upon each other. The properties of particle
A, e.g. its mass, are responsible for the motion of particle B and vice versa. It cannot be determined ‘which acceleration
of which particle comes first’. If there are no forces at all, then there are no accelerations and the state of the system
stays the same, which is also a time-symmetric setup. There is no distinction between cause and effect through time-
order, as cause and effect (accelerations of the two particles) are happening simultaneously (velocity of interaction is
infinite). This can be seen very clearly in Newton’s law of gravity
F = G
mAmB
r2
. (20)
Here, the physical origin for the fact, that cause and effect are interchangeable, is the identity of passive and active
mass for every particle. This corresponds to the third Newtonian axiom. Thus, in Newton’s theory there is only
inter-action. Cause and effect always have the same time-coordinate and are exchangeable.
Accepting the conceptual equality of cause and effect directly leads to the reversibility of all microscopic equations
and vice versa. In fact, the Newtonian laws are only time-reversible since they rely on a concept of interaction and not
time-ordered causation. This holds for the Hamiltonian formulation of mechanics as well as the equivalent Newtonian
formulation.
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In Maxwellian electrodynamics, the situation might at first seem different, since in the framework of this theory
signals can travel at most with the speed of light. Thus, at first sight there seems to be a fixed time-order of causes
and effects. Still, Maxwell Equations are known to be invariant under time reversal and simultaneous reversal of the
magnetic field. It is the existence of both advanced and retarded solutions that makes Maxwellian electrodynamics
invariant under time reversal. When advanced solutions are dismissed on the basis of ‘causality’, as is done in many
text-books on electrodynamics, already the reversibility of the theory is given up. So, the reversibility of Maxwellian
electrodynamics depends on the acceptance of advanced solutions, in other words solutions where in a conventional
dictation cause and effect would be exchanged. Only under this premise is the theory time-reversible because only
then it is not possible to distinguish between cause and effect because every process can happen in both directions:
For every process with cause A and effect B one must accept the possibility of a process with cause B and effect A.
In addition we do not make any assumptions about the probabilities of those processes (which in fact is not possible
in the framework of Maxwellian electrodynamics).
If in the following we speak of time-ordered causality, we do not refer to the reversible causality just described for
the case of electrodynamics but imply that cause and effect are not conceptually equivalent. In a strong version of
time-ordered causality at least for some processes with cause A and effect B there does not exist a corresponding
process with cause B and effect A. In a weaker version of time-ordered causality, for every process with cause A and
effect B there exists a corresponding process with cause B and effect A, but the probabilities of both processes differ.
The weaker version is essentially the solution to the irreversibility problem as given by Boltzmann. This solution is
possible because the microscopic equations do not make any statements about the probabilities of processes. They
only state, if processes are allowed in principle or not.
It is tautological to say that time-ordered causality can solve the problem of irreversibility. The microscopic
equations do not exhibit time-ordered causality. Once we admit a clear distinction between events of cause and events
of effect, then of course physics is not reversible by definition. But this distinction should also be represented in the
fundamental equations.
V. CONCLUSION
The main point of this text was to show, that the probabilistic foundations of statistical physics as developed by
Boltzmann, Planck, Einstein, Smoluchowski and others are of a very general nature and should if correct incorporate
both equilibrium and nonequilibrium thermodynamics. Identifying entropy with probability leads to the possibility of
fluctuations and renders all processes reversible. The system will always fluctuate around the most probable state and
thus the system will never be exactly in an equilibrium state (corresponding to the most probable state). Conceptually
it is not possible to adequately distinguish between equilibrium and nonequilibrium states. Consequently, we have set
out in this work to derive one of the recent results of nonequilibrium thermodynamics starting from the foundations
of general statistical physics. With two additional assumptions a Fluctuation Theorem can be derived only from
S = kB lnP . Of course, the argument followed in this manuscript does not render the results of nonequilibrium
thermodynamics (or thermodynamics of irreversible processes) redundant. It only suggests how they might fit into
the framework of general statistical physics. Accepting the probabilistic interpretation of entropy, a statistical physics
of processes should be possible within the general framework of statistical physics.
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